Abstract. The inverse equilibrium bidding strategies {v i (b)} n i=1 in a first-price auction with n asymmetric bidders, where v i is the value of bidder i and b is the bid, are solutions of a system of n first-order ordinary differential equations, with 2n boundary conditions and a free boundary on the right. In this study we show that when the number of bidders is large (n 1), this problem has a boundary-layer structure with several nonstandard features: (1) The small parameter does not multiply the highest-order derivative. (2) The number of equations goes to infinity as the small parameter goes to zero. (3) The boundary-layer structure is for the derivatives
Introduction.
Auction is an important economic mechanism, which is central to the modern economy. For example, in 2013 the US treasury auctioned securities in a total sum of 7.9 trillion dollars. Google makes most of its profits by selling sponsored links via online auctions. The first systematic analysis of auctions was done in 1961 by Vickrey [15] . Since then, auctions have been the subject of an intense study. For an introduction to auction theory, see, e.g., [8, 9] .
In this study we analyze a boundary value problem that arises in the study of asymmetric first-price private-value auctions, in which n risk-neutral bidders compete for a single object. Each of the bidders submits his bid in a closed envelope; the highest bidder wins the object and pays his bid, while all other bidders pay nothing. In this case, the inverse equilibrium bidding strategies {v i (b)} n i=1 are the solutions of [10, 12] (1.1a Here F i (v i ), the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the private value of bidder i, is a twice differentiable function that satisfies
Equation (1.1) is a free boundary value problem, since the locationb of the right boundary is unknown. This problem is nonstandard, because 1. the n first-order ODEs are subject to 2n boundary conditions; 2. by (1.1b) and (1.2), the right-hand side of (1.1a) at b = 0 is of the form "0/0." Hence, one cannot apply the standard local existence and uniqueness theorem to the initial value problem (1.1a)-(1.1b). Consequently, there is little understanding of (1.1). This is in contrast with the symmetric case of identical bidders (F i = F for i = 1, . . . , n), where the equation for v i = v sym (b) can be solved explicitly (see section 2.1) and so "everything" is known. Indeed, most of auction theory concerns the symmetric case not because bidders are believed to be symmetric, but simply because the analysis of asymmetric auctions is much harder.
Existence and uniqueness of solutions of (1.1) were proved by Maskin and Riley [12] and by Lebrun [10] . In [1] , Fibich and Gavious analyzed (1.1) in the case of a weak asymmetry (F i = F + εH i , where ε 1), by using perturbation analysis to expand v i (b) in a power series in ε about the known symmetric solution v sym (b). In [5] , Fibich and Gavious considered the special case where F i = v αi for i = 1, . . . , n, since in that case (1.1) can be transformed into an autonomous dynamical system (section 7). This transformation revealed that the nonuniqueness at b = 0 is "equivalent" to a saddle point with an (n−1)-dimensional unstable manifold, and the original solution corresponds to a trajectory that exits from the saddle point. Over the years, asymmetric first-price auctions were also studied numerically (section 8). Nevertheless, despite all the research effort, the present understanding of the solutions of (1.1) is limited, and so the effect of bidders' asymmetry remains unclear.
In [16] , Wilson showed that lim n→∞ v i (b) = b under quite general conditions. In this study we show that when the number of asymmetric bidders is large (n 1), we can exploit the presence of the small parameter 1/(n − 1) in (1.1a) to go beyond this limiting result. Specifically, we obtain O(1/n 3 ) explicit approximations of the solutions of (1.1). Since our approximations are already valid when n is moderately large, and not only in the limit as n → ∞, they are relevant to real-life first-price auctions.
Nonstandard boundary-layer problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the mathematical model for asymmetric first-price auctions. In section 2.1 we review the symmetric case, where explicit solutions are available. In section 3 we derive some technical results that will be used later on.
In section 4 we use regular perturbations to compute a solution of (1.1) of the form does not satisfy these equations atb, even to leading order! In section 5.1 we resolve this "anomaly" by showing that there is a narrow boundary layer near the right boundaryb, in which v i "bifurcates" from v outer i . A priori, this suggests that, as is the case in boundary-layer theory, the solution in the boundary-layer is of the form
This computation yields
, where ξ = (b − b)/δ is the rescaled boundary-layer variable and δ is the width of the boundary layer. It turns out, however, that this is not the case. Rather, the solution in the boundary layer has the nonstandard form of being the sum of an outer solution in the original variable and a small inner solution in the rescaled variable; i.e.,
, thus resolving the "anomaly" observed earlier. In other words, the boundary layer is for v i and not for v i . Another difference from standard boundary-layer problems is that the small parameter 1/(n − 1) does not multiply the highest-order derivative. Therefore, it is not a priori clear why there should be a boundary layer.
Further analysis shows that the boundary layer width is δ = 1/(n − 1) 2 . The inner solution satisfies a constant-coefficient eigenvalue problem (section 5.2), and its coefficients are determined from the boundary conditions at the right boundary and from matching of the boundary-layer solution v 3 ) accuracy of these approximations is confirmed numerically in section 6, even for moderate levels of n. In section 7 we view the boundary-layer analysis from a dynamical systems perspective. In particular, we show that the outer solution is equivalent to the saddle-point trajectory, and the boundary-layer solution corresponds to the trajectory that leaves the saddle point. In section 8 we consider numerical methods for solving (1.1). In particular, we utilize the boundary-layer analysis to gain further insight on the instability of the popular backward shooting method. Section 9 concludes with some final remarks.
Level of rigor.
For lack of a better terminology, the asymptotic analysis results in this paper are referred to as "lemmas" and "propositions," and their derivations are referred to as "proofs." We stress, however, that these results are not rigorous, since we did not prove that the order of magnitude of the error terms is the one which we obtained using formal asymptotic analysis. Nevertheless, the agreement between the asymptotic results and the numerical simulations provides strong support for the correctness of these results.
Model formulation.
Consider n risk-neutral bidders (players) that compete in a first-price auction, in which the highest bidder wins the object and pays his bid while all other bidders pay nothing. Let us denote by v i the valuation of the ith bidder for the object (roughly speaking, this is the maximal price that a rational bidder is willing to pay for the object). We assume that v i is private information to bidder i, and that v i is drawn independently according to a twice continuously differentiable CDF F i (v i ), whose support [0, 1] is common to all bidders; see (1.2). We also denote by f i = F i the corresponding density function.
be the bid function of bidder i in equilibrium. Since the equilibrium bids are strictly monotonic [12] , we can define the inverse equilibrium bid functions v i = v i (b i ). The first-order condition for equilibrium yields (1.1a).
1 Since a bidder with zero valuation will not submit a positive bid, we have (1.1b). In addition, in equilibrium all bidders with the highest valuation (i.e., v i = 1) place the same (unknown) maximal bid, denoted by b; see [10, 12] .
2 Therefore, we have (1.1c).
Symmetric bidders.
When bidders are symmetric (i.e., F i = F for i = 1, . . . , n), the inverse bid functions are identical; i.e., v i (b) = v sym (b) for all i. Since the right boundary condition (1.1c) is automatically satisfied, the boundary value problem (1.1) reduces to the initial value problem
This equation can be easily solved [15] , yielding
3. Notation and preliminary technical lemmas. Two matrices play an important role in the analysis of (1.1). The first is (3.1) 
where c is an arbitrary constant. Proof. By Lemma 3.1, d is an eigenvector of B 0 with eigenvalue λ = n/(n − 1), and 1 spans the null space of B 0 .
The second matrix which is central to the analysis is Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.
1.
An important role will be played by the geometric mean of the CDFs, as follows.
.
In particular,
4.
Analysis of large auctions-Naïve (outer) solution. As the number of bidders increases, the competition between bidders becomes more intense, and therefore they have to increase their bids in order to maintain their chances of winning the object. Consequently lim n→∞ v i (b) = b; see [16] . Motivated by the asymptotic expansion in the symmetric case (see [2] ), we look for a solution of (1.1a) in a power series in 
be a solution of (1.1a) of the form (4.1). Then
Proof. Substituting (4.1) into the large brackets expression in (1.1a) gives
GADI FIBICH AND NIR GAVISH
Therefore, substitution of (4.1) into (1.1a) gives
A priori, to leading order the left-hand side is O(1), whereas the right-hand side is O(n). Therefore, we first impose the condition that the right-hand side also be O (1) . This implies that
. Therefore,
Substituting this into (4.3) gives
Hence, by (3.5b),
Furthermore, (4.5) and (4.6) imply that
The O 1 n error can be absorbed into the next-order terms in the expansion. Therefore, the equations for (3.5b ) and (4.2)), the general solution of (4.7) is (see Lemma 3.2)
is an arbitrary function. Hence,
Carrying the expansion to the next order yieldsw(b) ≡ 0 (see the supplementary materials for this paper). Therefore, the result follows. We now computeb by imposing the right boundary condition, as follows.
n , from which the result follows.
Inconsistencies. If we carry the expansion of v
This yields
Sinceb depends on i, v 
Proof. Substituting b =b into (1.1a) gives
On the other hand, by (4.2),
GADI FIBICH AND NIR GAVISH
Therefore, if v outer i satisfies (1.1) at b =b to leading order, then by (4.12) and (4.13),
, which is impossible. This result is surprising, since v outer i does satisfy (1.1a) to leading order. Note, however, that the inconsistency arises only after we impose the boundary condition atb; i.e., v outer i satisfies (4.11) to leading order, but it does not satisfy (4.12) to leading order. does not satisfy these equations atb, even to leading order. Since the inconsistencies arise only atb, this suggests that v i has a boundary layer nearb where it undergoes fast changes from (1) fi (1) (see (4.9) and (4.12)).
In standard boundary-layer problems, there is a small parameter that multiplies the highest-order derivative in the equation, and the outer solution is found by setting this parameter to zero. This is not the case in (1.1), where the small parameter
does not multiply the highest-order derivative in (1.1a). Indeed, it is not obvious at all from inspection of (1.1a) that the solution should have a boundary layer! In addition, in standard boundary-layer problems, the outer solution satisfies the ODE and one boundary condition but does not satisfy the second boundary condition even to leading order, which is not the case here.
Boundary-layer thickness.
The solution in the boundary-layer region is usually found by rescaling the independent variable by the boundary-layer thickness. In the case of (1.1), this means looking for a solution of the form
is the boundary-layer thickness. Because of the nonstandard form of (1.1), however, substitution of this form does not lead to a consistent solution of (1.1). Indeed, the most difficult part of this research has been to find the solution form in the boundary layer. It turns out that the solution in the boundary layer is the sum of the outer solution in the original variable and a boundary-layer component in the rescaled variable, i.e.,
where v outer i is given by (4.2), δ is the boundary-layer thickness, and γ is the magnitude of the boundary-layer component.
Proof. By (4.9) and (4.12),
3 These inconsistencies will be resolved in section 5.1. 4 Here we assume that we can use estimate (4.9) forb, which was derived by approximating v i with v outer i . An a posteriori justification for this approximation is that because δ(n) = (n − 1) −2 , the effect of the boundary-layer component onb is only O(n −2 ).
On the other hand, by (4.2) and (5.1),
Therefore,
Since 1 −
fG (1) fi (1) and
We now show that δ(n) = (n − 1) −2 by ruling out all other possibilities. (4.10) . This is a contradiction.
• Assume that
Therefore, as in the derivation of (4.3), substituting (5.3) into (1.1a) yields
As in the proof of Proposition 4.1, the requirement that both sides be of O(1) yields
Thus, for j = i,
GADI FIBICH AND NIR GAVISH
Since v
in the boundary layer, 5 we have that
This equation is satisfied only for δ(n) = 1 or δ(n) = 1 (n−1) 2 , a contradiction. By Lemma 5.1, the solution of (1.1) is of the form
Fi − u, and ξ = (n − 1)
is the boundary-layer variable.
Note thatb =b(n). Expression (5.4) resolves the inconsistencies encountered in section 4.1. Indeed, since
in the boundary-layer region (i.e., for 
where
are constants, and {λ j } n j=1 and {u j } n j=1 are the eigenvalues and normalized eigenvectors of the symmetric matrix S; i.e.,
and B is given by (3.4) . Proof. Substitution of (5.4) into (1.1a) gives (4.5) plus new terms due to v
Taking the difference of this equation and (4.5) yields
Since in the boundary-layer region
Hence, to leading order, v
These equations can be written in matrix form as
, . . . , 1 f n (1) .
In order to work with a symmetric matrix, let
Since S is symmetric, it has n real eigenvalues and corresponding orthonormal eigenvectors. Therefore, the general solution of (5.10) is u inner = In order to perform the matching, we first prove the following. 
Proof. Substituting v i (b) = 1 into (5.4) gives (5.14)
. As in Corollary 4.2, the balance of the O(n −1 ) terms yields
The balance of the O((n − 1) −2 ) terms in (5.14) gives (5.13b).
Before we proceed, we prove an auxiliary result. Lemma 5.6. Let u n be the eigenvector of S that corresponds to the positive eigenvalue λ n . Then
and
It is easy to see that the matrix S 0 := P T (−B 0 )P has the eigenvalue λ n = 0 with normalized eigenvector u
. By Rellich's theory for perturbation of eigenvalues of Hermitian matrices [14] , the eigenvalue λ ε n and eigenvector u ε n of S ε are analytic in ε. Therefore,
Substituting this expansion into S ε u n (ε) = λ n (ε)u n (ε) and balancing the O(ε) terms gives S 0 u 
Since S = S ε= 1 n , the result follows. 
Proof. By (4.2),
Sinceb is independent of i, so is w
Multiplying this equation by f i (1) and using (5.12), one obtains
Taking the inner product with u n and using (5.15) gives
Taking the inner product with u j and using (5.15) gives c j .
Lemma 5.8.
Proof. By Lemma 5.5,
In addition, by (5.16),
The second expression forb 2 follows from (3.5c).
Summary.
The results of Proposition 4.1 and section 5 are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.9. Let n 1. Then the solution of (1.1) is given by
; the maximal bid is given bȳ 
As noted, the boundary value problem (1.1) consists of n first-order ODEs, 2n boundary conditions, and a free boundary. The n ODEs, coupled with the n boundary conditions at b = 0, determine a unique outer solution. This suggests that the inner solution is overdetermined, since it has n + 1 degrees of freedom (n from the n first-order ODEs and one from the free boundary) and 2n constraints (n matching conditions and n boundary conditions atb). The boundary-layer analysis reveals, however, that the n matching conditions reduce to a single condition (c n = 0). 7 6. Simulations. We compute solutions of (1.1) using the boundary value method (section 8.2). We first consider the power-law distributions (6.1)
For example, when n = 5, then Figure 1(A) ), and when n = 10, then {F i } In the case of n = 5 players, the five computed curves {v i (b)} 5 i=1 are nearly indistinguishable (Figure 2(A) ). Indeed, by (5.17),
The five curves are closer to each other than to lim n→∞ v i (b) = b. Indeed, by (5.17),
7 A similar conclusion follows from the dynamical systems analysis in [5] ; see section 7. Indeed, a priori, matching the trajectory that ends at the diagonal (which corresponds to the inner solution) with the saddle-point solution (which corresponds to the outer solution) amounts to n matching conditions. Since the dimension of the unstable manifold at the saddle point is n − 1, however, the n matching conditions reduce to a single condition. In the inner graph of Figure 2 (A) we zoom in near b =b and v i = 1 and observe that the five curves are different and well resolved. As we increase the number of bidders to n = 10 and then to n = 20, the curves get closer to each other, and to a lesser extent to v i = b (Figure 2 (B) and (C)), in agreement with (6.2). The ten (or twenty) curves are well resolved; see the inner graphs of Figure 2 (B) and (C). Figure 2 may give the false impression that "all" the differences among
disappear as n → ∞. To see that this is true everywhere but nearb, in Figure 3 we plot the derivatives of the solutions plotted in Figure 2 . In all three cases, except nearb,
are nearly indistinguishable from each other and approach 1 as n → ∞. The {v i } have a boundary layer nearb; i.e., they undergo fast changes in a narrow region nearb, whose width decreases to zero as n → ∞. In the inner graphs of In Figure 6 (A) we plot the difference betweenb asymptotic (see (5.17d)) and the computed value ofb. This difference scales as |b −b asymptotic | ∼ 0.0475/n 3 , thus confirming the O(n −3 ) accuracy ofb asymptotic (see (5.17d)). Power-law distributions have some unique properties, such as stochastic dominance and zero crossings. In addition, for the specific choice (6.1) we have that F G = v 2 . Therefore, the high-order derivatives, F
G , which might affect the high-order terms in the asymptotic expansion, vanish identically. To repeat the simulations with CDFs that do not have these properties, we consider players that are divided into four groups such that each group has n/4 players, and each player in the ith group independently draws his value according to the distribution (6.3)
where i = 1, . . . , 4. These distributions have multiple crossings (see Figure 1 (B)), and their geometric average is
In Figure 7 (A) we plot
for the case of n = 4 players. As predicted by Kirkegaard [7] , since the CDFs cross each other, so do the four bidding strategies. As the number of players increases to n = 12 and n = 20, {v i (b)} n i=1 get closer to each other and to a lesser extent to lim n→∞ v i (b) = b (see Figure 7 
| as a function of b and observe that the scaled difference is almost independent of n, both in the outer region (Figure 8(B) ), and in the boundary layer region (Figure 8(C) ). In Figure 9 we repeat this procedure for v 1 − (v satisfies (1.1) to leading order at and nearb. Therefore, the error of (v i ) bl is expected to be O(1/n) in the boundary-layer region (see proof of Lemma 5.2). In the outer region, however, the inner solution component becomes exponentially small, and so
. Finally, Figure 6 (B) shows that |b−b asymptotic | ∼ 2/n 3 , thus confirming the O(n −3 ) accuracy ofb asymptotic .
Dynamical systems perspective.
In [5] , we considered the special case of power-law distributions, In this case, the substitutions v i (b) = b V i (b) and b = e w transform (1.1a) into the autonomous dynamical system
the left boundary condition (1.1b) transforms into ), which is a saddle point. The solution of (7.2) is thus a trajectory that starts at V saddle and intersects with the diagonal V 1 = · · · = V n atV := (V , . . . ,V ).
We now relate the dynamical systems description to the boundary-layer analysis. 1a)-(1.1b) . This solution can be expanded as
is the unique solution of (1.1a)-(1.1b) that has this expansion (Proposition 4.1), the result follows.
Thus, in the case of power-law distributions we have v outer i exactly, and not only to O(n −3 ). In [5] we showed that linearization of the solution of (7.2a) about V saddle gives 
and B is defined in (3.4) . In terms of the original variables, (7.3) reads
We now show that (7.4) agrees with the boundary-layer approximation 
Hence, for b 1+λj to identify with e λj ξ , we should have that Finally, we note that the dynamical systems formulation may give the false impression that "all the dynamics" occurs as the solution moves from the saddle point to the diagonal. In fact, the boundary-layer analysis reveals that "most of the dynamics" occurs near the saddle point, and that the transition from V saddle toV corresponds to the narrow boundary layer nearb.
Nonsmoothness at b = 0.
The dynamical systems analysis showed that the solution can be approximated by (7.4) . Since genericallyλ i is not an integer, the solution of (1.1) is generically not in C ∞ at b = 0. Since, however,λ i ∼ −n 2 λ i , the smoothness at b = 0 increases with the number of players; i.e., v i ∈ C k , where
. The boundary-layer analysis does not reveal the nonsmoothness at b = 0. This is because v inner is expanded aboutb, whereas the nonsmoothness occurs at b = 0.
Numerical methods.
Because of the lack of explicit solutions, numerical simulations play an important role in the study of asymmetric auctions. Computing solutions of (1.1), however, cannot be done using standard numerical methods for boundary value problems, because of the nonuniqueness at b = 0 and because the location of the right boundary is unknown.
Backward shooting.
The first numerical method for solving (1.1) was developed in 1994 by Marshall et al. [11] . They used a backward shooting approach, in which they searched for the value ofb for which the backward solution of (1.1a) subject to (1. 1c) satisfies (1.1b) . The backward shooting method became the standard method for asymmetric first-price auctions and was used in numerous studies. Nevertheless, its performance was far from optimal, and it quickly deteriorated as the number of bidders was increased. In fact, it could not even handle auctions with more than six players. Therefore, this method is ill-suited to studying large asymmetric auctions. 
Boundary value method.
In [4] we developed a different method, the boundary value method, for computing solutions of (1.1). To overcome the difficulty that the location of the right boundary is unknown, we change the independent variable from b to v n . As a result, the transformed system of ODEs resides on a fixed known domain and can thus be solved using standard methods such as fixed-point iterations or Newton's iterations. The boundary value method has proved to be much more robust than backward shooting, and it performs well even with hundreds of players. The method has no inherent bound on accuracy and can reach machine accuracy at reasonably large grids [4, section 4.3] .
We briefly mention some implementation details. Because of the boundary-layer structure of the solution, we use a nonuniform grid that concentrates more grid points in the boundary layer. In addition, when implementing Newton's method, we used an appropriate staggered grid that leads to narrow-banded linear systems, which can be solved significantly faster than the linear systems that arise in naïve implementations. See [3] for more details, and [4, online supplement] for MATLAB codes.
Instability of backward shooting.
In [4] we pointed out that the backward shooting method is inherently unstable. Because of the lack of explicit solutions in the asymmetric case, we used the explicit solution in the symmetric case (section 2.1) to show analytically that in the symmetric case the backward shooting method is unstable and that this instability increases with n. Then we showed numerically that the instability in the asymmetric case is "similar" to that in the symmetric case.
We can use boundary-layer analysis to gain further insight into the instability of the backward shooting method, as follows. Consider the backward solutions {v ε i (b)} of (1.1a) for b ≤b ε :=b ε , with the "initial" conditions
We first show (informally) the following claim. fi (1) . 10 None of the simulations presented in this study could have been done using backward shooting. Substitutingb (see (4.9)) into the above expression yields the result.
The instability of backward solutions is illustrated numerically in Figure 10 9. Concluding remarks. In this study we used boundary-layer theory to analyze asymmetric first-price auctions. While this methodology is standard in applied mathematics, to the best of our knowledge it has not been previously used in auction theory.
Asymmetric bidders have O(1/n) differences in the competitions they face, since bidders i and k face the same n − 2 bidders, but bidder i faces k whereas bidder k faces i. Consequently, one would expect to have O(1/n) differences among their equilibrium strategies. Our analysis reveals, however, that v i (b) − v k (b) = O(n −2 ), i.e., that these differences are much smaller. As n → ∞, the O(n −2 ) differences among {v i } n i=1 vanish, and the boundary-layer thickness goes to zero. The boundary layer, however, does not disappear. In particular, the O(1) differences among the derivatives {v i (b)} n i=1 persist as n → ∞. The analysis in this paper reveals that when n is large, the "correct" averaging of the CDFs is the geometric one. In the case of weakly asymmetric auctions, Fibich and Gavious used the arithmetic average of the asymmetric CDFs in their analysis [1] . Their results, however, did not imply that the correct averaging of the CDFs is the arithmetic one, since when the asymmetry among the CDFs is O(ε), the arithmetic and geometric averages are O(ε 2 ) equivalent. In contrast, as n → ∞, the difference between the arithmetic and geometric averages does not go to zero. Therefore, it seems that the correct averaging in asymmetric first-price auctions is the geometric one.
11
As n increases, the number of ODEs in (1.1) increases. This is different from standard boundary-layer problems, where the system itself does not change as the small parameter goes to zero. Therefore, we need to clarify what we mean by "letting n go to infinity." One possibility is to have c i = β i n bidders with CDF F i (v), where i = 1, . . . , K.
12
Since the number of equations is fixed, it is clear what we mean by letting n go to infinity. A second approach is based on the observation that the geometrical average of the CDFs plays a key role in the limit. Therefore, we can consider a sequence of families of CDFs {F 1/n does not change with n. 13 Note that under this approach, some, or even all, of the CDFs change as n increases.
